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Industry, State, and Electrical

Technology in the Ruhr circa 1900

By Edmund N. Todd*

CONSTRUCTING ELECTRIC POWER and light systems early in the twen-

tieth century challenged existing institutional boundaries. Large-scale tech-

nological systems had a wide variety of internal components, the development of

which provided new opportunities to serve more customers and wider areas. If

controlled by one institution, the growth of a technological system might benefit

that institution and not others. Such was the case with electricity. Deployment of

electric power systems required renegotiation of institutional boundaries, as

leaders of various organized bodies used new technology to promote their own

interests.

The problem of analyzing the development of early power systems is not sim-

ply one of establishing whether public or private individuals should build public

utilities. That is an old and sterile debate. To understand the process of change, it

is more fruitful to investigate how people used technology as a political resource

in promoting institutional growth and how they resolved their differences.

Around 1900 there were at least four different kinds of institutions that competed

to build regional power systems in Germany: electrical manufacturers, municipal

governments, county administrations, and heavy industrialists. Electrical manu-

facturers were already involved in building municipal electrical systems, which

they often owned or leased. Electricity was also among the many services al-

ready supplied by municipal administrations. As alternating-current technology

improved, municipal systems expanded and often came into conflict with power-

ful state officials at the county (Landkreis) level of administration, who oversaw

the supply of services to their rural constituents. Finally, industrialists were

building power systems to generate electricity for their firms' consumption and

sometimes for sale.

The Ruhr provides a useful focus for investigating institutional and technologi-

cal change. It is a fairly small region, some forty miles long and perhaps twenty

miles wide. In the later part of the nineteenth century, the development of heavy

industry led it to become one of the most densely populated regions in Germany.

The rapid growth of population required new public service systems. During the

late 1880s electric manufacturers approached municipal governments about

building electric central stations, but met little success in the Ruhr. The largest

cities developed their own public service systems, and several of them expanded
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their electric power and light systems to serve surrounding county areas. Thus in

the Ruhr some of Germany's largest cities and most-powerful municipal adminis-

trations came into confrontation with powerful local state officials. County com-

missioners (Landrdte), the linchpins of the Prussian bureaucracy, were instru-

mental in building regional public service systems and hoped also to control new

electric power systems. By the 1890s heavy industrial leaders had organized a

regional syndicate, the Rhenish-Westphalian Coal Syndicate, to set production

quotas and market coal, and they were seeking ways to rationalize production to

reduce costs. Electricity provided an opportunity to integrate productive facili-

ties and to sell a new by-product. New large-scale organizations that were na-

tional or even international in orientation dominated heavy industry and electri-

cal manufacturing. In the Ruhr they confronted both the old state apparatus

designed for an agricultural state and newer municipal administrative organiza-

tions that threatened the power of the state at the local level.1

Divergent social, political, and economic goals brought the leaders of the dif-

ferent institutions into conflict, and electrical technology became a powerful in-

strument in negotiating relations among cities, counties, heavy industrial firms,

and to a lesser extent electrical manufacturers. While municipal governments

could tie surrounding county areas to themselves through new public service

technologies, county governments often fought to maintain their independence

from municipal control. Conflict between city and county had an important im-

pact on electrification. County officials hoped to ward off municipal control by

creating regional systems, and they had some success, particularly in building

systems for fresh water supply and waste water disposal. County governments

controlled the use of streets and were crucial in deploying new electric technol-

ogy. Landrate hoped electricity would promote rural economic development.

After 1900 several heavy industrialists added to the confusion by promoting eco-

nomic concentration in the form of vertically integrated coal, iron, and steel

companies. They also threatened to take over several public service technologies

and hence to dominate economic and technology policy in the Ruhr. The state

opposed them. Conflict was rife. As a result, those who built technological sys-

tems also constructed new institutions designed to resolve conflict over the con-

trol of electrical technology in the years 1904 to 1909.

I. ELECTRICAL MANUFACTURERS

Electrical manufacturers built the first electric central stations in Germany. Emil

Rathenau became a patent licensee for the Edison system after visiting the Paris

International Electrical Exhibition in 1881. Three years later he built a power

station in Berlin. To develop the electric lighting business in Germany, Rathenau

organized the Allgemeine Elektrizitdts-Gesellschaft (AEG) in 1887, and the Ber-

lin electric lighting company became an AEG subsidiary.2 During the 1880s the

I For the development of municipal systems in the Ruhr see Edmund N. Todd, "Technology and

Interest Group Politics: Electrification of the Ruhr, 1886-1930" (Ph.D. diss., Univ. Pennsylvania,

1984), pp. 18-72.

2 For the transfer of Edison's system to Germany and the development of the Berlin power system

see Thomas P. Hughes, Networks of Power: Electrification in Western Society, 1880-1930 (Balti-

more: Johns Hopkins Univ. Press, 1983), pp. 66-75, 175-200. My intellectual debt to Professor

Hughes is extensive.
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AEG became an important competitor of Siemens and Halske, which had grown

large on telegraphy business. The AEG had close ties to banks from its inception

and was quick to develop the kind of managerial hierarchy and multidivisional

structure necessary to expand into a new area of business with rapid technologi-

cal change. Siemens retained its older style of personal management until 1890,

when its founder retired and the company became a leader in developing new

managerial structures. Siemens was then able to regain its position, although

AEG continued to be its chief rival. After 1900 the two giants of German electri-

cal manufacturing absorbed most of their smaller competitors.3

Electrical manufacturers actively sought to sell electric lighting systems to mu-

nicipal governments in the 1880s and 1890s. They sometimes established subsidi-

aries to operate the stations, as the AEG did in Berlin. In the Ruhr, the electrical

manufacturer Lahmeyer founded the Rheinisch-Westfalisches Elektrizitatswerk

(RWE) in 1898 to operate the central station for the city of Essen. The creation of

subsidiaries allowed the inclusion of local interests and local capital, while hold-

ing companies financed and organized central station subsidiaries. Electrical

manufacturers also provided advice and information on building power systems,

in order to promote the sale of equipment by helping cities to establish central

stations. Municipal governments needed advice to make sense out of the vast

variety of plans resulting from the inchoate nature of the technology. Choosing

one electrical manufacturer solved the problem of selecting a system, particularly

if the manufacturer promised a good return for its monopoly of city streets.

However, city governments had developed a distrust of private capitalists oper-

ating public service technologies, particularly in the case of gas lighting. Hence

some city governments preferred to hire engineers to build a municipal power

system composed of components from several different manufacturers. Dort-

mund followed this path.4

After 1900 electrical manufacturers continued to be important sources of infor-

mation for municipal and state governments interested in building regional sys-

tems. Electrical manufacturers also became important proponents of regional and

even national systems. As early as 1912, Georg Klingenberg of the AEG began

suggesting that a national system was possible and desirable. He promoted his

vision in a series of essays in the German electrical journal Elektrotechnische

Zeitschrift before and during the war. Walther Rathenau, son of the founder of

the AEG, also promoted a national system through a financial union that, he

hoped, would facilitate technological development. Both thought that the state

would have to play a key role in building such a system as a means of overcom-

ing local control of the technology. Klingenberg noted in 1913 that Landrate, not

mayors, had built regional systems, and as a result the state had to step in to

ensure that the organization of the technology could move ahead to the next

3 For these developments in electrical manufacturing see Jurgen Kocka, "Siemens und der Auf-

haltsame Aufstieg der AEG," Tradition, 1972, 17:125-142; and Kocka, "Entrepreneurs and Managers

in German Industrialization," in The Cambridge Economic History of Europe, 7 vols. (Cambridge:

Cambridge Univ. Press, 1978), Vol. VII, pp. 492-589, 709-727, esp. pp. 558-562, 569.

4 Erich Zweigert, Die Verwaltung der Stadt Essen im XIX. Jahrhundert mit besonderer Beruck-

sichtigung der letzten funfzehn Jahre (Essen: G. D. Baedeker, 1902), pp. 567-599; "Zusammenstel-

lung der Submissionresultate," 14 Aug. 1895, B 3-1304, pp. 84-85, Stadtarchiv Dortmund; Hans-

Dieter Brunkhorst, Kommunalisierung in 19. Jahrhundert dargestellt am Beispiel der Gaswirtschaft

in Deutschland (Munich: Tuduv, 1978); and C. Dopke, Das stadtische Elektrizitatswerk in Dortmund

(Dortmund: F. W. Ruhfus, 1900).
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stage of development in a national system. Both Klingenberg and Rathenau

wanted industry-that is, electrical manufacturers-to run the system created by

state intervention. They sought institutional allies to gain control of a nation-

al grid.5

II. MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENTS

Industrial development in the western provinces after the 1870s brought signifi-

cant changes in the distribution of population in Germany from the east to the

west and from rural to urban areas. Growing cities developed housing, transpor-

tation, water, sewage, health, and lighting problems. Throughout Germany, mu-

nicipal governments became much more active in dealing with urban problems

and became noted for their "municipal socialism." Municipal governments began

providing services and even began operating businesses such as slaughterhouses

to generate income so that cities could provide other services without raising

taxes. Supplying gas and water to city populations was among the earliest tasks

taken up by municipal governments. During the 1850s Bochum and Duisburg

established the first gas facilities in the Ruhr. In 1864 Essen opened the first

waterworks, and in the 1870s other cities followed its lead. Municipal adminis-

trations became more professional and expanded in size as they increased ser-

vices. After unification of Germany in 1871, several cities gained independence

from county control: Essen in 1873, Duisburg in 1874, Dortmund in 1875, and

Bochum in 1876. These cities no longer reported to Landrate and thus had more

freedom from direct state control.6

Essen and Dortmund provide good examples of how municipal administrations

and mayors became involved in solving municipal problems. In Essen heavy

industrial development brought a large number of health, housing, and welfare

problems. Attempts on the part of private citizens to deal with those problems

proved unsuccessful in the 1860s and 1870s, and as a result the city administra-

tion became increasingly active. Erich Zweigert, mayor from 1886 to 1906, accel-

erated this development, so that by 1914 the municipal government touched al-

most all aspects of city life. He took decisive steps to solve the housing problem

by outmaneuvering the Landrat of the county of Essen to double the area of the

city in 1901. The increase in territory allowed the city to plan housing necessary

for its rapidly growing population. Mayor Wilhelm Schmieding of Dortmund also

exemplified the qualities of the new, active mayors throughout Germany. He

believed that city governments should provide water, gas, electricity, transporta-

5 Helga Nussbaum, "Versuche zur reichsgesetzlichen Regelung der deutschen Elektrizitatswirt-

schaft und zu ihrer Uberfuhrung in Reichseigentum 1909 bis 1914," Jahrbuch fur Wirtschaftsge-

schichte, 1969, Pt. 2, pp. 117-203; Georg Klingenberg, "Richtlinien fur den Bau groler Elektrizitats-

werke mit Dampfbetrieb," Elektrotechnische Zeitschrift, 1912, 33:731-735, 766-769, 796-800,

814-818, 880-882; Klingenberg, "Elektrische GroBwirtschaft unter staatlicher Mitwirkung," ibid.,

1916, 37:297-298, 314-317, 328-333, 343-348; Walther Rathenau, "Denkschrift, betreffend ein

Reichs-Elektrizitatsmonopol," 13 Nov. 1913, Deutsches Zentralarchiv Potsdam, Reichskanzlei, Vol.

598a, pp. 372-379v, rpt. in Nussbaum, "Versuche," pp. 192-203; and Georg Klingenberg, "Elektri-

zitatswerke und Uberlandzentralen," Elektrotech. Z., 1913, 34:315-317.

6 Wolfgang R. Krabbe, "Munizipalsozialismus und Interventionsstaat: Die Ausbreitung der stadtis-

chen Leistungsverwaltung im Kaiserreich," Geschichte in Wissenschaft und Unterricht, 1979,

30:265-283; and Helmuth Croon, "Stadtewandlung und Stadtebildung im Ruhrgebiet im 19. Jahrhun-

dert," in Aus Geschichte und Landeskunde: Forschungen und Darstellungen (Bonn: Rohrscheid,

1960), pp. 484-501.
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tion, parks, and public welfare institutions. The administrations in Essen and

Dortmund, like other municipal administrations, had become quite intervention-

ary in their relationships to economic and social development by 1900.7

To solve local problems, municipal governments often sought to work through

private companies. Before the 1850s municipal governments avoided risks on

new gas technology by having private companies introduce gas lighting systems.

Municipal governments began considering municipal ownership as a means of

increasing their incomes from gas, but during the 1860s most cities continued to

allow private ownership of gas lighting systems and signed new long-term con-

tracts to gain expanded and improved service. As they increased their economic

activities, municipal administrations began promoting technological change in the

gas lighting industry to improve services further. Private owners were less inter-

ested in upgrading their systems, however, since they were receiving steady in-

comes and wished to amortize investment in existing facilities. Thus during the

1880s and 1890s many cities purchased gas companies in order to improve light-

ing service. Previously, civil servants had not thought it appropriate to spend tax

money on risky ventures, and they were wary of attempting to manage produc-

tive facilities. By the 1880s and 1890s, however, gas technology had largely

proved itself, and municipal administrations needed new sources of income to

help finance other services. Municipal administrations solved the management

problem by creating a separate administrative structure for the gasworks. There

were also a number of legal forms available, such as partnerships, companies

with limited liability (Gesellschaften mit beschrdnkter Haftung), and joint stock

companies (Aktien-Gesellschaften), that provided other institutional forms for

managing a productive facility. These forms were more important for electri-

fication.8

Private capitalist control of the technological system could prevent technologi-

cal change. In Dortmund, for instance, the municipal government could not per-

suade the privately owned gas company to introduce electric lighting in the early

1890s. The gas company received judicial support for its assertion that its con-

tract with the city gave it exclusive control of municipal streets for lighting sys-

tems, forcing the city to renegotiate its contract with the company. In exchange

for a longer contract and the right to deliver gas for heating and cooking pur-

poses, the gas company agreed to give up its exclusive use of city streets for

lighting and to allow the city to begin operating its own electric lighting system.9

Essen's experience with electric traction illustrates the same problem: private

companies often refused to improve their technological systems and sometimes

prevented technological change. Because no one in Essen's municipal adminis-

tration thought that a traction system could pay for itself, the city had developed

a contract to induce private parties to build a system for the city. In the early

1890s the city renegotiated the contract to persuade the private company to build

an electric rather than a steam traction system, but since the contract did not

7Eugene Charles McCreary, "Essen 1860-1914: A Case Study of the Impact of Industrialization on

German Community Life" (Ph.D. diss., Yale Univ., 1964); and Friedrich Horstmann, "Dr. phil. h.c.

Wilhelm Schmieding, Oberburgermeister der Stadt Dortmund 1886-1910," Beitrage zur Geschichte

Dortmunds und der Grafschaft Mark, 1962, 58:304-324.

8 Brunkhorst, Kommunalisierung (cit. n. 4).

9 For a general discussion of private gas company reactions to electricity see ibid., pp. 142-147.

For Dortmund see Todd, "Technology and Politics" (cit. n. 1), pp. 27-30, 38-39.
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preserve any direct role for the municipal administration in the company, the city

had no leverage in dealing with the company. Soon after its completion the trac-

tion system proved inadequate. The city administration spent the later half of the

1890s trying to find a way to force the private company to improve and expand

the system to serve areas of the city that might not provide as high a rate of

return on capital investment as other, more densely populated areas.10 Municipal

governments learned that private companies might take the initial risk of intro-

ducing new technology but might not continue to do so if they were making

profits on their initial investment. Experience during the 1890s with private com-

panies proved important after 1900, when heavy industrialists began taking over

public utilities.

There was another aspect of municipal development that proved important in

electrification. Essen and Dortmund had evolved as administrative, economic,

and transportation centers. Dortmund was the seat of two state organizations-

the Superior Mining Office (Oberbergamt) and the Superior Post Office (Ober-

postdirektion)-and its Guild Chamber (Handwerkskammer) provided further re-

gional significance. Essen was the seat of various mining associations, the Ruhr's

railroad administration, and regional organizations for water and sewage. Its

banks made Essen a financial center for the Ruhr. Essen and Dortmund also had

chambers of commerce, whose importance reached beyond municipal bound-

aries. Because they played such key roles in their areas, Essen and Dortmund

eventually incorporated almost their entire county areas, organized in the early

nineteenth century. Both cities also had integrated elites who supported munici-

pal administrations that looked beyond city boundaries to solve regional prob-

lems. Mayors Zweigert and Schmieding were therefore both instrumental in in-

troducing electrical technology in the form of alternating-current systems that

would enable their cities to serve customers beyond municipal boundaries. How-

ever, municipal control of regional technological systems threatened the indepen-

dence of surrounding communities and counties, and thus it might prevent the

development of regional technological systems. Aware of this problem, Mayor

Zweigert had the Landrat of the county of Essen lead negotiations for the street-

car system that would serve county and city. He also recognized that private

control of the streetcar system would overcome the fears of Essen's neighbors."

III. LANDRATE AND THE STATE

In the late 1870s the state in Germany turned away from its earlier laissez-faire

orientation and became more active in the economy. One outcome of this change

was a new tariff policy in 1879 to protect certain industries and east Elbian agri-

culture. In the early 1890s the new Reich chancellor, Leo von Caprivi, lowered

agricultural tariffs as part of a government economic policy to expand opportuni-

ties for German industry in foreign markets and increase employment. His new

10 Erich Zweigert to town council (Stadtverordnete-Versammlung), 28 Dec. 1902, Rep. 102, I,

1274, pp. 38-83, Stadtarchiv Essen.

11 Croon, "Stidtewandlung" (cit. n. 6); Helmuth Croon, "Zur Entwicklung der Stadte im 19. und

20. Jahrhundert," Studium Generale, 1963, 16:565-575; Croon, "Burgertum und Verwaltung in den

Stadten des Ruhrgebiets im 19. Jahrhundert," Tradition, 1964, 9:23-41; Edmund N. Todd, "A Tale of

Three Cities: Electrification and the Structure of Choice in the Ruhr, 1886-1900," Social Studies of

Science, 1987, 17:387-412; and Zweigert to town council, 28 Dec. 1902 (cit. n. 10).
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policies did help produce rapid industrial development, which led to an important

debate concerning Germany's shift from an agricultural to an industrial state. In

part, the government became increasingly involved in response to real problems

faced by the elites holding power as the population was moving into industry and

electoral politics was producing an increasingly large faction of Social Democrats

in the Reichstag. Some groups opposed the development of an industrial and

urban society as an unhealthy threat to the Prussian state and German culture.

Conservatives took up these ideas in the 1890s to buttress the position of the

aristocracy and agricultural interests. A rural-romantic orientation became popu-

lar among some groups in German society, including Prussian bureaucrats, who

to a large extent represented the interests of the aristocracy.12

The antiurban and anti-industrial orientation of Prussian state officials affected

the development of local state institutions, particularly in the industrializing and

urbanizing areas. Prussian state institutions reached down to the local village;

thus Prussian ministers in Berlin could, in theory, use the bureaucracy to exert a

substantial degree of local control. The most important positions in the exercise

of local control were the district president (Regierungsprdsident) and the Land-

rat (county commissioner). The district president reported directly to Berlin and

directed the administrative activities of the Landrate in his government district

(Regierungsbezirk). The district president did not have a legislative body through

which he could create new local legislation but instead had to work through

Landrate to create local responses to local problems. Counties had a level of

self-government (Selbstverwaltung) over which Landrate presided; Landrdte

thus had a dual function. They were administrators who reported to a district

president and ultimately to the minister of the interior in Berlin, but they

also had a certain amount of local autonomy owing to their ability to direct legisla-

tion in their counties. Landrate could function as entrepreneurs by creating orga-

nizations to provide services for their counties, and they could join together to

build regional systems. Landrate also had a degree of autonomy because of their

local ties. In order to bind local government to the state, the Prussian minister of

the interior often chose Landrate from the area in which they were going to

serve, making sure, however, to choose persons loyal to the conservative Prus-

sian state. Thus Landrdte were tied ideologically to the agrarian-dominated, con-

servative state bureaucracy, but because of their local connections and local

power they expressed their administrative and entrepreneurial functions differ-

ently depending on the region in which they worked and the kind of local clien-

tele they served.13

The antiurban orientation of the conservative state preserved the position of

Landrat and hence state power in industrial regions. Until the 1870s all cities in

the Ruhr were under the administrative direction of Landrnte. Then in rapid

succession Essen, Dortmund, Duisburg, and Bochum received full city rights and

12 For a survey of the literature on the relationship between the aristocracy and the bureaucracy

see Gary Bonham, "State Autonomy or Class Domination: Approaches to Administrative Politics in

Wilhelmine Gemany," World Politics, 1983, 35:631-651.

13 Herbert Jacob, German Administration since Bismarck: Central Authority versus Local Auton-

omy (New Haven, Conn.: Yale Univ. Press, 1963), pp. 12-62; Heinz Gunther Steinberg, "Zur Ver-

waltungsgeschichte des Ruhrgebietes," in Politik und Landschaft, ed. Walter Foerst (Cologne/Berlin:

Grote, 1969), pp. 177-215; and Lysbeth W. Muncy, "The Prussian Landrate in the Last Years of the

Monarchy: A Case Study of Pomerania and the Rhineland in 1890-1918," Central European History,

1973, 6:299-338.
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became independent of Landrate supervision. After the 1870s, however, al-

though population density increased rapidly in the Ruhr, few cities gained inde-

pendence. The position of Landrat gave the state more direct control over

workers and local economic activity than it would have with a mayor in an inde-

pendent city. Mayors were often too liberal as well. Prussian policies kept large

numbers of people under the direct control of state officials. In 1911 Hamborn,

north of Duisburg, held the distinction of being the largest Prussian "rural com-

munity" (Landgemeinde), with 100,000 inhabitants. At that time there were

ninety-nine "rural communities" in Prussia with more than 10,000 inhabitants, all

in industrial areas. The Rhineland and Westphalia together had fifty-one, while

other areas of Prussia contained three hundred "cities" with fewer than 2,500

inhabitants. 14

Landrate in the Ruhr opposed the change from an agrarian to an industrial and

urban nation and hoped to use modern technology to direct change along other

paths. Karl Gerstein, Landrat in the county of Bochum from 1900 to 1919, be-

lieved that farmers were crucial for a healthy state but were losing ground. His

position as Landrat gave him the means to shape industrial and urban develop-

ment so as to preserve the independence of rural communities. He opposed the

growth of large cities through incorporation of neighboring communities because

the process destroyed local self-government and the communal, economic, and

cultural life necessary for a healthy society. To oppose the expansion of large

cities and preserve the autonomy of rural communities and small towns, Gerstein

worked to establish regional rather than municipal public utility systems. This

was a sound policy that helped overcome the parochial orientation of cities. The

influx of laborers into the Ruhr's growing industrial productive sites placed sig-

nificant demands on local budgets to provide necessary services. Through public

service systems for gas, water, transportation, and electricity, towns and cities

tried to increase their own incomes and at the same time prevent a distribution of

income to surrounding communities faced with the same kinds of financial prob-

lems. Landrate could work against such parochial policies because they served a

larger area, the county, than did municipal governments.'5

Landrat Gerstein was a key figure in organizing a number of regional systems

to deal with the problems of urbanization and industrialization. In 1902 he orga-

nized a public water supply system, the Verbandswasserwerk GmbH, to enable

financially weak communities in the counties of Bochum, Gelsenkirchen, and

Hattingen to gain their independence from the city of Bochum by securing a

common supply of water. The business form chosen enabled each community to

hold a block of shares and to include new communal groups through the sale of

stock.'6 Gerstein also took decisive steps to solve regional sewage and waste

water problems. The population along the Emscher River had increased from

14 Helmuth Croon, "Die VerwaltungsmaJige Gliederung des mittleren Ruhrgebietes im 19. und 20.

Jahrhundert," in Bochum und das mittlere Ruhrgebiet, ed. Gesellschaft fur Geographie und Geologie

Bochum (Paderborn: Ferdinand Schoningh, 1965), pp. 59-64, on p. 61.

15 Alfred zur Nieden, "Karl Gerstein," Rheinisch-Westfdlische Wirtschaftsbiographie, 13 vols.

(Munster: Aschendorff, 1932-), Vol. 1, pp. 487-518; Franz-Josef Bruggemeier, Leben vor Ort: Ruhr-

bergleute und Ruhrbergbau, 1889-1919 (Munich: C. H. Beck, 1983), pp. 32-41.

16 Nieden, "Gerstein," pp. 502-504; and Ludwig Aschoff, "Die Gruppenwasserversorgung in

rheinisch-westfalischen Industriebezirke durch das Verbandswasserwerk," Technisches Gemeinde-

blatt: Zeitschriftfiur die Technischen und Hygienischen Aufgaben der Verwaltung, 1905, 7:337-341.
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35,000 in 1870 to 1,340,000 in 1900 as mining activities moved northward in the

Ruhr. Mining caused the ground to settle, thus increasing the swampy conditions

along the slow-moving Emscher. As Regierungsassessor (government assessor)

in charge of water management in the government district of Arnsberg before

becoming Landrat, Gerstein had recognized the need for a regional solution to

deal with problems in a zone divided among 2 provinces, 3 government districts,

6 cities, 8 counties, 43 Amter (offices), and 137 local communities. In 1904 the

Emschergenossenschaft was established to regulate the Emscher so as to solve

pressing problems resulting from urbanization and industrialization while pre-

serving the autonomy of the communities between the Emscher and the Ruhr

rivers. Public and private organizations producing the sewage and waste water

contributed funds, but control was in the hands of the participating cities and

Landkreise. Gerstein became the chairman of the Genossenschaft in 1906.17

Landrate like Gerstein worked against the narrower perspectives of municipal

governments in developing organizations that could deal with regional problems.

These organizations provided potential models for regional electric light and

power systems. They also reflected the opposition of Landrate and other state

officials to urbanization and industrial concentration. Landrate had already

found the means for building Ruhr-wide technological systems to maintain local

control and promote local development when heavy industrialists began chal-

lenging state power in the Ruhr. These industrialists were to present a fourth

institutional niche for the building of a regional electric power and light system.

IV. VERTICAL INTEGRATION AND ELECTRICITY

One of the key issues in German history concerns the development of large-scale

industries with complex managerial hierarchies. One current line of thought is

that modern multiunit enterprises developed as a means of overcoming the ad-

vantages that England had on the world market. Banks helped surmount capital

shortages by concentrating capital from a large number of people, while joint

stock companies enabled a firm to draw on savings of small shareholders to

invest in new forms of production technology that would allow the Germans to

compete with the English. Increasing the scale of production required new means

of managing large numbers of people involved in diverse stages of production,

sometimes in different locations. These changes were perhaps most evident in

German steel, iron, and coal production, particularly in the Ruhr. There, coal

mining required concentration of capital, and as a result, banks were involved

early in financing the introduction of deep shaft mining. Iron and steel companies

developed a diverse line of goods to attract customers and sought to integrate

production from raw materials to finished product. Some iron and steel manufac-

turers purchased coal mines to build vertically integrated companies. A further

incentive to technological integration of the firm came with attempts to cut down

on fuel costs from heating iron ore, pig iron, and then steel in several different

stages of production from blast furnace to finished product. Production in "one

17 Heinrich Helbing, "Die Emschergenossenschaft, Essen," in 25 Jahre Emschergenossenschaft,

1900-1925, ed. Helbing (Essen: Emschergenossenschaft, 1925), pp. 1-17; Hans Luther, "Vorwort:

Die Emschergenossenschaft als besondere Verwaltungsform des Ruhrgebietes," ibid., pp. v-xii; and

Alexander Ramshorn, "Die Emschergenossenschaft," in Fiunfzig Jahre Emschergenossenschaft,

1906-1956, ed. Ramshorn (Essen: Emschergenossenschaft, 1957), pp. 33-82.
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heat" required extensive financial resources and managerial control to ensure a

smooth flow of material through the company.18

During the 1890s heavy industrial companies searched for ways of reducing

costs. Gas engines provided one means of turning a waste product into a usable

commodity. They could burn either blast-furnace gas or coking gas, although

they usually used blast-furnace gas, since coking gas could be sold more profit-

ably for lighting. In the late 1890s the Horder Verein introduced the first blast-

furnace gas engine. Within ten years engines producing up to 4,000 horsepower

allowed companies to utilize blast-furnace gas to power blast equipment or elec-

tric dynamos. This development in the iron and steel industry meant that large

companies were not readily available as consumers of publicly generated elec-

tricity. But they could sell electricity. Coal mines also developed an electric-

generating capacity in order to utilize waste coal that could not be sold or other-

wise used. They introduced turbines and exhaust turbines, using steam from

other turbines, to generate electricity. Both gas engines and waste coal-fired

turbines improved the energy efficiency of the Ruhr's heavy industry.19

After 1900 heavy industrial companies began building electric transmission and

distribution systems in the Ruhr. A large company often had productive facilities

in several different areas, and electric transmission systems allowed a company

to tie facilities together to improve overall efficiency in a technologically inte-

grated system. A company could also improve its use of its installed equipment

by providing electricity to neighboring communities, since industry and local

communities had different load patterns. Industry showed peak periods of con-

sumption in the early morning and early afternoon, whereas towns had a lighting

load in the early evening. Industrial systems supplying towns could therefore

utilize equipment more fully, thus increasing the income from fixed capital in-

vestments. Towns could gain a cheap source of electricity without having to

build or expand municipal power stations.20

Several companies promoted this model of electrification, but the most impor-

tant example was the Rheinisch-Westfalisches Elektrizitatswerk (RWE). The

electrical manufacturing firm Lahmeyer had established the RWE in 1898 to

operate the electric power and light system in the city of Essen. In 1902, to

overcome financial difficulties, Lahmeyer sold its shares in the RWE to two

leading heavy industrialists, Hugo Stinnes and August Thyssen. The RWE built

its first power station on a Stinnes mine, from which it drew steam to circumvent

the Rhenish-Westphalian Coal Syndicate's coal quotas and prices. After 1902 the

RWE also began transmitting electricity to another Stinnes mine, which be-

came the first mine in the Ruhr to depend wholly on an outside source of elec-

tricity. The RWE supplemented its own generation of electricity by arranging

18 Jurgen Kocka, "The Rise of the Modern Industrial Enterprise in Germany," in Managerial

Hierarchies: Comparative Perspectives on the Rise of the Modern Industrial Enterprise, ed. Alfred

D. Chandler, Jr., and Herman Daems (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press, 1980), pp. 77-116;

and Kocka, "Entrepreneurs and Managers" (cit. n. 3), pp. 555-589.

19 For the development of gas engines and heavy industrial power systems see H. Bonte, "EinfluB

der Grol3gasmachine auf die Entwicklung der HIittenwerke." Zeitschrift des Vereines Deutscher In-

genieure, 1908. 52:1912-1916; and Die Entwiickelung des Niederrheinische-Westfilischen Steinkoh-

len-Bergbaues in der zwieiten Hlafte des 19. Jahrhunderts, ed. Verein fMr die Bergbaulichen Interes-

sen, 12 vols. (Berlin: Springer, 1902-1905). Vol. VIII, pp. 417-719.

20 Professor Baum, "Beitrage zur Frage der Krafterzeugung und Kraftverwertung auf Berg-

werken," Gluckauf, 1906,42:1001-1015. 1033-1047, 1083-1088, 1137-1155.,on pp. 1144-1155.
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energy exchange contracts with several heavy industrial firms (Deutsch-

Luxemburgische Bergwerks- und Hutten-AG, Gewerkschaft Deutscher Kaiser,

and the Gelsenkirchener Bergwerks-AG). Stinnes sought to build the RWE into a

company serving the area from the Lippe River to Aachen. It looked to some like

the ideal combination of heavy industrial generation of electricity and industrial

and communal consumption. Stinnes thus promoted a fourth model: regional

electrification in private hands and closely tied to heavy industrial interests.21

V. BUILDING A REGIONAL SYSTEM

By 1902 there were four institutional structures that might have provided a basis

for a new regional technological system in the Ruhr. At this time alternating-

current transmission systems combined with the increasing size of steam turbines

permitted and perhaps even required regional systems, which could supply a

variety of customers with varied demand schedules and hence allow a more bal-

anced load on equipment. Municipal systems could expand outward and serve

surrounding areas, but state officials wanted to avoid economic and demographic

concentration in cities. In the Ruhr, Landrate had helped organize new institu-

tions to deal with regional problems by maintaining local control and opposing

urban concentration, and they hoped to do the same for electricity. Electrical

manufacturers offered a third institutional structure, one that would place control

in their hands and might avoid urban or state control. Heavy industrialists pro-

moted development of a regional system, but one narrowly tied to heavy indus-

trial goals. From 1904 to 1909 in the Ruhr, members of these four types of organi-

zations struggled to build and control an electric power and light system for the

Ruhr. The confrontation over the new technology involved important institu-

tional and political stakes and could not be resolved within the existing institu-

tional framework, or within one technological system.

The immediate impetus for conflict came from Stinnes and Thyssen. They

began to expand the RWE to serve an area that encompassed the Ruhr at the

very time that they were trying to reorganize heavy industry there. The RWE

provided a technological means for the reorganization. In 1905 the company

began building its second power station on a mine controlled by Stinnes near

Dortmund. It sought to supply several of Stinnes's holdings around Bochum and

gained customers near its new Westphalian power station. The power company

also tried to build lines to connect its new power station and its old one in

Essen.2 Concurrently, to implement their organizational goals the two heavy

industrialists tried to take over one of the largest coal mining companies in the

Ruhr, Emil Kirdorf's Gelsenkirchener Bergwerks-AG. When this attempt failed,

they helped Kirdorf convert his company into a vertically integrated mining and

foundry company. Kirdorf also signed an energy exchange contract with the

21 For the early development of the RWE see Zweigert, Verwaltung (cit. n. 4), pp. 567-599; Ca-

millo J. Asriel, Das R.W.E., Rheinisch-Westfalisches Elektriziatswerk A.G., Essen a. d. Ruhr: Ein

Beitrag zur Erforschung der modernen Elektrizitatswirtschaft (Zurich: Girsberger, 1930), pp. 1-24;

and Ernst Henke, Das RWE nach seinen Geschdftsberichten, 1898-1948 (Essen: RWE, 1948), pp.

5-27. For a report of Stinnes's goals see Arthur Schreiber (district president of Dusseldorf), "Bespre-

chung uber die Versorgung des rheinisch-westfalischen Industriegebietes mit Elektrizitat durch das

Rheinisch-Westfalische Elektrizitatswerk," 8 Dec. 1905, Regierung Dusseldorf 9892, pp. 294-298,

Hauptstaatsarchiv Dusseldorf (hereafter HStA Dui); and Baum, "Beitrage," pp. 1007, 1153.

22 Asriel, R.W.E., pp. 7-8; Henke, RWE, pp. 15-19.
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RWE and joined its board of directors. Because of Stinnes's maneuvers in heavy

industry and electric power, state officials became concerned about the state's

relationship to the economy and to economic leaders in the Ruhr. To protect

their power, Prussian officials sought to purchase a controlling interest in a large

coal mine (Bergwerksgesellschaft Hibernia) but met stiff opposition from many

heavy industrialists in a confrontation that became known as the "Hibernia Af-

fair."23 State officials also became anxious about the effect Stinnes might have on

electrification, which they saw as related to his maneuvers in heavy industry.24

The Ruhr fell mostly within the government districts of Dusseldorf in the Rhine

province and Arnsberg in Westphalia, and their presidents organized the initial

state reaction to the RWE. They opposed the private monopoly of a public ser-

vice. The district president in Arnsberg thought such a monopoly would become

a "pressing burden" on the public, and he observed that the section of heavy

industry connected to the RWE exerted "great influence" on many communities

in the Ruhr. That section would support the RWE's expressed concern for the

common good and "cultural progress" only so long as it did not conflict with

heavy industry's "financial interests." The district president in Dusseldorf be-

lieved that a private monopoly would make the Ruhr's economic development

depend on the RWE. To protect local communities from "adroit business repre-

sentatives," the district presidents sought to ensure adequate technical advice by

coordinating responses to the RWE.25 They also gained the right to review the

RWE's petitions to lay transmission and distribution lines on railroad property.

This important concession prevented the RWE from circumventing a commu-

nity's main bargaining chip, control of streets for supply systems. If the RWE

could use railroad rights of way, it could build up a set of powerful local cus-

tomers who might insist that a community sign a supply contract favorable to the

RWE and not to the community.26

Despite similarities in views and tactics, negotiations in the two areas followed

different paths. The district president of Dusseldorf called several meetings in fall

1905 with leading electrical manufacturers to discuss an electric supply system

that would be independent of Stinnes and the RWE. Topics included a loose

alliance of systems rather than one big system controlled by the RWE, and a

system based on a coal mine on the left bank. Georg Klingenberg, who later

promoted a national grid, argued that there were limits in size above which it was

not economical to build a power system. Hence he discounted the alliance of

systems and supported a system serving the left bank. The district president

identified a key characteristic of any such system: it would have to match RWE

23 For the changing relationship between state and industry and the "Hibernia Affair" see Charles

Medalen, "State Monopoly Capitalism in Germany: The Hibernia Affair," Past and Present, 1978,

78:82-112.

24 See the draft report, Privy Councillor Putch (Government District of Dusseldorf) to Minister of

Public Works, 16 Jan. 1905, Regierung Dusseldorf Prasidialburo 1068, pp. 5-12, HStA Da.

25 Franz von Coels (district president of Arnsberg) to Hugo Stinnes, 8 Dec. 1905, Regierung Dus-

seldorf 9892, p. 318, HStA Di; Coels to Minister of the Interior, 7 Dec. 1905, Oberprasidium 6238,

Staatsarchiv Mbnster; Arthur Schreiber to Minister of the Interior, 4 Dec. 1905, Regierung Duissel-

dorf 9892, pp. 248-253; and Coels to provincial president of Westphalia (Eberhard von der Recke), 31

May 1904, Oberprasidium 6238. For the district of Dusseldorf see Schreiber to "Landrate, Oberbur-

germeister, und Btirgermeister,' 27 May 1904, Regierung Dusseldorf 9892, pp. 11-12.

26 In August 1905 the minister of public works ordered the railroad administration to consult with

the district presidents before allowing the RWE to deliver electricity from cables on railroad prop-

erty; see Minister of Public Works to District President in Dusseldorf, 15 Aug. 1905, Regierung

Dusseldorf 9892, p. 99.
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prices in order to persuade communities to sign supply contracts, since he could

not force them to sign.27 But the RWE already had a number of advantages. By

1905 it had built an extensive electric power and light system in the Rhine prov-

ince and in Westphalia and could offer low prices to potential customers. More-

over, a communal government did not control it. Hence, the RWE could gain

counties as customers in a way that a municipal system could not, and municipal

governments, in turn, could avoid county control by joining the RWE's system.

For instance, the mayor of the recently established Westphalian city of Gelsen-

kirchen looked to the RWE for assistance in securing his independence from

Landrate. In promoting its version of a regional system, the RWE supported the

mayor of Gelsenkirchen in his bid to open up surrounding county areas for future

incorporation. The RWE also supported Landrate against mayors where they

were the more powerful local figures, as it did the Landrat in the Rhenish county

of Kempen in 1910. For this tactic to succeed, the RWE had to change its busi-

ness structure to include communal interests. This change did not come, how-

ever, in time to circumvent opposition in Westphalia, and as a result the RWE

was unable to include the entire Ruhr in its system.28

In the district of Arnsberg, the district president, Landrdte, and mayors

worked together against the Rhenish, heavy industrialist-dominated RWE. The

district president played a key role in promoting the development of electrifica-

tion under the control of local state and municipal officials. He hoped to keep

public service systems in public hands, and he was able to find powerful allies

among the Landrate of the district. One of the most important Landrdte was Karl

Gerstein in the county of Bochum. He helped organize a number of meetings to

coordinate responses to the RWE's expansion. Gerstein wanted a system for the

entire Rhenish-Westphalian industrial area in order to maintain local autonomy.

He sought to build a broad consensus for regional electrification among officials

in Berlin, in regional and local levels of administration, and in local state agencies

concerned with mining, canals, and railroads. Gerstein also requested support

from the most important regional coal organization with the argument that a

unified regional system would benefit the coal industry.29

A regional solution for the Ruhr in the form of a technological system con-

trolled by Landrate failed. The communities could not finance the system. Per-

haps more important, the RWE was already too strong in the Rhenish section of

the Ruhr, and heavy industrialists opposed state control. Gerstein believed that

the communal project required the "unlimited cooperation of industry in the en-

tire region," because each mine shaft would soon be generating electricity. Only

27 For discussions concerning the left bank see "Besprechung, betr. Lieferung von Elektrizitat fur

das rheinisch-westfalische Industriegebiet durch das Rheinisch-Westfalische Elektrizitatswerk in

Essen," 30 Nov. 1905, Regierung Dusseldorf 32044, pp. 73-74, HStA Dui; other reports are contained

in Regierung Dusseldorf 9892, pp. 282-287, 294-298, 313-314, ibid.; and "Besprechung uber die

Verhandlungen betr. die Versorgung des rheinisch-westfalischen Industriegebietes mit elektrischer

Kraft," 23 Dec. 1905, Oberprasidium 6238, Staatsarchiv Munster.

28 For Gelsenkirchen see Regierung Dusseldorf 32044, pp. 182-184, HStA Du; and Bernard Gold-

enberg, "Besprechung mit Herrn Oberburgermeister Machens wegen des Demarkation Westfalen," 8

Jan. 1907, Stinnes Nachlass, 316/1, Archiv fur Christlich Demokratische Politik, Adenauer Stiftung,

Bonn. For Kempen see W. von Tippelskirch to Landrat Hermann Strahl, 7 May 1910, Stinnes Nach-

lass, 150/1, ibid. Other mayors were not inclined to follow Gerstein's lead; see District President in

Arnsberg to Minister of the Interior, 7 Dec. 1907, Oberprasidium 6238, Staatsarchiv Munster.

29 Karl Gerstein to District President in Dusseldorf, 10 Aug. 1905, Regierung Dusseldorf 9892, pp.

100-101, 103, 105-106, HStA Di!; Gerstein to Rheinisch-Westfalisches Kohlensyndicat, 12 Aug. 1905,

Oberprasidium 6238, Staatsarchiv Munster.
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if the coal mines provided electricity for a communal system to distribute could

the project supply electricity at the lowest possible rates. But, Gerstein noted,

the Rhenish-Westphalian Coal Syndicate rejected collaboration, as did individual

mines and the industrial corporations controlled by Stinnes, Thyssen, and Kir-

dorf. Thus collaboration with an influential segment of the Ruhr's heavy industry

was not possible.30 The institutional context worked against either heavy indus-

trial or state control of a power system to unify the Ruhr.

Partial resolution of the conflict came through a blurring of the boundary be-

tween state and industry in both sections of the Ruhr. Stinnes reorganized the

RWE to include municipal and county participation. In 1904 and again in 1905 he

proposed that the Prussian state purchase shares in the RWE and place represen-

tatives on the company's board of directors. Such a maneuver might have helped

the RWE politically by redefining institutional stakes in the conflict over the

technological system. But the Prussian ministers decided in 1905 and again in

early 1906 not to participate in the RWE because of local opposition to the com-

pany, particularly in Westphalia.31 The RWE instead began modifying its institu-

tional makeup by selling stock to cities and counties and by placing representa-

tives of these potent institutions on the RWE's board. This maneuver solved

political problems by providing the semblance of public influence over the RWE.

State agencies had sided with communal governments against the RWE, but the

RWE could gain state support if it had communal allies. The new mixed business

form also helped the RWE financially. It could gain new territory by exchanging

RWE stock and a position on the board for communally owned power systems

and communally guaranteed loans.32 Institutional innovation allowed technologi-

cal change, in the Ruhr and in other areas of Germany.

Landrate in the Westphalian section of the Ruhr followed a similar path in

establishing a mixed corporation. After receiving ministerial permission in De-

cember 1905, Gerstein helped build a new company in Bochum that drew on a

Westphalian mine for electric power, on Berlin banks for financing, and on elec-

trical manufacturers for expertise. The chairman of the board was Walther Ra-

thenau, director of the Berliner Handelsbank and son of the founder of the elec-

trical manufacturing firm AEG. The chairman of the managing committee was

also a director of the AEG's subsidiary for electric light and power companies.

The new company, Elektrizitatswerk Westfalen AG, founded in July 1906, com-

bined municipal, county, banking, mining, and electrical manufacturing interests.

It rapidly took steps to define a territory from which it could exclude the RWE.33

30 Karl Gerstein, "Anlage eines gemeinsame kommunalen Elektrizitatswerkes fur den rheinisch-

westfalischen Industriebezirk," 25 Nov. 1905, Regierung Dusseldorf 9892, pp. 245-246, HStA Di!;

and Gerstein to District President of Dusseldorf, 25 Nov. 1905, ibid., pp. 242-243.

31 For evaluations of Stinnes's first offer and its rejection see Peters, "Hafenerweiterung Ruhrort,"

26 Mar. 1904, Regierung Dusseldorf Prasidialburo 1068, pp. 17-24, HStA Dii. Also see ibid., pp.

5-13; and Finance Minister, Minister of Public Works, Minister of the Interior, and Minister for

Commerce and Industry to Stinnes, 11 Jan. 1906, Regierung Munster 5537, Staatsarchiv Munster.

32 See Asriel, R.W.E. (cit. n. 21), pp. 10, 14-15; and Richard Passow, Die gemischt privaten und

offentlichen Unternehmungen auf dem Gebiete der Elektrizitats- und Gasversorgung und des

StraJ3enbahnwesens (Jena: Gustav Fischer, 1912).

33 Gerstein to District President of Arnsberg, 17 Dec. 1906, KrA 495, pp. 304-306, Stadtarchiv

Bochum; Landkreis Bochum, "Verwaltungs-Bericht des Kreis-Ausschul3es des Landkreises Bo-

chum," 1906, pp. 48-49, ibid., and Walter Lipken, Die v'ereinigten Elektrizitatswerke Westfalen,
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The corporation, like the reorganized RWE, combined business and government

in a new institution, and, as in the RWE, business predominated. But unlike the

RWE's institutional innovation, innovation in Arnsberg did not go far enough to

suit local interests. National electrical and banking corporations provided exper-

tise and financing for the Westphalian mixed company, but they did not protect

local municipal and county officials who wanted to force the RWE out of West-

phalia. The officials had to take over the company and divide the Ruhr to protect

their interests.

VI. DIVIDING THE RUHR

Landrate, mayors, small manufacturers, and electrical manufacturers in the dis-

trict of Arnsberg worked together in 1906 to try to find a way of building a new

power station or taking over the RWE's second power system near Dortmund in

order to provide electricity for the area around Hagen to the south. County and

municipal governments provided the forum for debate and negotiations, but dif-

ferent local social and economic interests used the local institutions to pursue

different ends. Gerstein's Elektrizitatswerk Westfalen in Bochum represented

several county governments, but the electrical manufacturers remained predomi-

nant. To the east the city of Dortmund sought to protect municipal interests and

the municipal system, which was increasingly insulated from the threat of the

RWE by the growing power of the Bochum company. The small manufacturers

in and around Hagen who controlled local governments felt themselves squeezed

by a heavy industry that provided raw materials and consumed end products.

They wanted control of economic and technology policy in their region, but they

did not yet have a source of alternating current.34 The district president of Arns-

berg sought consensus among the three disparate groups to build a company to

take over the RWE's Westphalian power system. He had to rely, however, on

the ability and willingness of Landrate and mayors to use their roles as heads of

local self-government to create new economic organizations.

The Arnsberg president did not have enough administrative power to hold the

alliance together. All three groups opposed Stinnes and the RWE, but the small

manufacturers in and around Hagen opposed collaboration with anyone in the

heavy industrial region and decided in 1907 to establish their own mixed power

company.35 They succeeded because local county and municipal governments

were autonomous enough to work against the district president and communal

officials in the heavy industrial section of the Ruhr. The electrical manufacturers

in the Bochum company also hindered unified development. Walther Rathenau

directed negotiations for Elektrizitatswerk Westfalen but ignored local goals.

Landrat Gerstein wanted to make taking over the RWE's second power system

GmbH Dortmund-Bochum-Muinster und ihre Entwicklungsgeschichte (Dortmund: Lensing, 1926), pp.

22-27.

34 On the negotiations see B 3-1977, 1978, and 1983, Stadtarchiv Dortmund; on Hagen see Ludwig

Beutin, Geschichte der sudwestfalischen Industrie- und Handelskammer zu Hagen und ihrer Wirt-

schaftslandschaft (Hagen: Linnepe, 1956), pp. 60-141.

35 See Willi Cuno (mayor of Hagen) to District President of Arnsberg, 30 Jan. 1907, B 3-1978, pp.

382-386, Stadtarchiv Dortmund; and Cuno, "Das kommunal Elektrizitatswerk Mark: AnschluJ3 an ein

Verbandswerk oder Bau einer eigenen Zentrale," 3 Feb. 1907, B 3-1977, pp. 204-211, ibid.
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one basis of agreement between the three Westphalian groups, but Rathenau and

Bochum's Berlin bankers did not think the investment was necessary.36 Ra-

thenau also ignored the interests of local officials in his negotiations with the

RWE and Dortmund over territory to be served by the companies and financial

arrangements to resolve differences among them.37 Westphalian Landrate had

not yet found a workable institutional basis for protecting their autonomy

through electrification.

By 1909 they had. Landrat Gerstein took over negotiations from Rathenau in

late 1907 and set boundaries between electrical supply areas that satisfied his

fellow Landrate in Recklinghausen and Gelsenkirchen. He celebrated the agree-

ment as the "second founding" of the Bochum electrical company.38 The RWE's

position in Westphalia had become untenable. It joined two heavy industrial

companies, Dortmund, and Elektrizitatswerk Westfalen in 1908 to form a new

mixed company to purchase and operate the RWE's Westphalian power system.

The city of Dortmund dominated the new company and used it to build a regional

system surrounding the city and county of Dortmund, served by the municipal

power company.39 There was also a realignment within the Bochum company.

Because the Berlin bankers did not protect local interests and because the com-

pany drew increasingly on counties for financial support, in 1909 the Landrdte of

Bochum, Gelsenkirchen, and Recklinghausen decided to buy out the banks'

shares in the power company.40 The Bochum company was then locally con-

trolled and communally owned, and it could expand in the same manner as did

the RWE. Both these firms offered stock and positions on the board to cities and

counties as incentives for joining their electric power system. The new mixed

structures internalized conflict among institutions as a basis for expanding tech-

nological systems, but none of them could unify the Ruhr in one system.

VII. CONCLUSION

Technological change after 1900 provided the means for building regional techno-

logical systems. But those systems did not grow inexorably as a result of the

development of new technology. New institutional arrangements were necessary

because Germany was divided among a number of large competing institutions

36 See Dbpke's report on the meeting of representatives of Elektrizitatswerk Mark, Elektrizitats-

werk Westfalen, and the city of Dortmund, 14 Nov. 1906, B 3-1977, pp. 54-64, Stadtarchiv Dort-

mund. See also Coels to Walther Rathenau, 28 Nov. 1906, KrA 495, pp. 262-266, Stadtarchiv Bo-

chum; and Gerstein to Rathenau, 19 Dec. 1906, ibid., pp. 308-309.

37 For local reactions to Rathenau's contract with Stinnes see Landrat in Recklinghausen to Ger-

stein, 6 Sept. 1907, KrA 496, pp. 116-117, Stadtarchiv Bochum; and Gerstein to District President of

Arnsberg, 31 Oct. 1907, ibid., pp. 108-112.

38 See Gerstein to District President of Arnsberg, 20 Dec. 1907, ibid., pp. 185-186. For the RWE's

original demands and the new agreement see Elektrizitatswerk Westfalen to Gerstein, 7 Jan. 1908,

ibid., pp. 206-219.

39 For the founding of the new company, the Westfalisches Verbands-Elektrizitatswerk, see Dis-

trict President of Arnsberg to provincial president of Westphalia (von Recke), 11 Apr. 1980, Oberpra-

sidium 6587, Staatsarchiv Munster; and " 1. Aufsichsrats-Versammlung des Westfdlischen Verbands-

Elektrizitatswerkes A.G.," 29 Apr. 1908, B 3-1991, pp. 102-110, Stadtarchiv Dortmund. For the new

mixed company's development see Lipken, Vereinigten Elektrizitatswerke Westfalen (cit. n. 33), pp.

10-20.

40 Karl Gerstein, Albert Hempel, Ludwig LeBret, and Ludwig Aschoff, "Denkschrift uber den

Erwerb von Akten des Elektrizitatswerk Westfalen durch die Beteiligten Kommunalverbande," I

Jan. 1909, KrA 501, p. 49, Stadtarchiv Bochum.
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that tried to use the new technology to expand at the expense of other institu-

tions. Cities were growing rapidly and offering new services to their own citizens

and to neighbors, many of whom were eventually incorporated into larger cities.

County administrations were made up of people who generally shared the oppo-

sition of Prussian civil servants to urban concentration and industrial growth.

They also sought to overcome the parochial goals of municipal governments that

hoped to use municipal monies to solve municipal rather than county or even

regional problems. Electrical manufacturers sought the potential profits from

building, supplying, and running regional systems. Contingent events influenced

development. In the Ruhr, heavy industrialists used electrical technology to pro-

mote vertical integration and their power in the region. Municipal and state gov-

ernments in Westphalia hoped to build their own regional system but built more

local ones instead. The RWE was too powerful in the Rhineland, and opposition

to it did not overcome all local differences. In the Rhineland, after initial op-

position, municipal and county governments began supporting the heavy indus-

trialists.

But not before an institutional innovation. Institutions provided the framework

for discussions and fights over electrification. The resolution of the struggle re-

quired the development of new, mixed corporations that could combine compet-

ing institutions and internalize conflict so that electrification could take place.

The RWE began selling stock to cities and counties or exchanging stock for

existing facilities. It also placed public representatives on its board. Westphalian

interests followed the same tactic. The balance of power in mixed, public-private

corporations reflected local conditions in the Ruhr and the rest of Germany. No

one institution, new or old, communal or commercial, was powerful enough to

force unification of the Ruhr in one technological system. Since institutional re-

lationships were at issue in the deployment of new technology, technological

change was inherently political. In building technological systems, Stinnes, Ger-

stein, and others had to construct new institutional relationships through new

business forms.

